By Dr. Abel Pires Da Silva
Blocking the internet, monitoring phone calls, and even banning satellite dishes. Since its February 1 coup, the military junta in Myanmar has weaponized all forms of communication, including the Internet, to control and silence the population.
As well as a deadly campaign of terror, which has seen more than 1,100 people killed, thousands arrested, and hundreds of thousands displaced in brutal military operations against protesters and ethnic communities, Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has relied on an array of tactics and tools to control access to information and track down its many opponents.
A further concern came in July, when Norwegian telecoms operator, Telenor, announced the planned sale of its Myanmar operations to M1 group, a Lebanese investment firm. Telenor, one of two foreign telcos to be operating in Myanmar, cited the “further deterioration of the situation and recent developments in Myanmar” as the basis of its sale.
Telenor’s pullout is the culmination of months of intense pressure from the military on telco operators since the coup, and comes after the junta banned senior foreign executives of telecommunications companies from leaving the country without permission. It has also been pressuring them to install surveillance software.
Telenor’s retreat from Myanmar is a major setback to its millions of subscribers who had hoped the company would protect their rights from a regime intent on using telecommunications information as part of its crackdown efforts. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Telenor was the only operator to publicly list the government directives it had received, before stopping for what it said was the safety of its employees.
Its expected replacement, M1 Group, does not have a strong track record in this area. According to rights group Justice for Myanmar, the company was founded by former Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and his brother, Taha, who are “mired in corruption” and have “a history of cosying up to dictators, disregarding human rights and privacy in search of profits“. Justice for Myanmar called on Telenor to “immediately reverse this shameful sale“.
M1 Group is presumably well aware of the junta’s weaponization of the telecoms sector, and yet had no issues moving ahead.
The military regime has resorted to other measures to control telecommunications, including blocking social media, nightly Internet shutdowns between February and May, cutting off mobile data and wireless broadband, banning satellite dishes, and “whitelisting” thousands of websites, ranging from e-commerce, to entertainment, news sites, web-based communications, and call centers.
In July, local outlet Frontier Myanmar revealed how the regime has also ordered mobile phone companies to install equipment that will enable them to monitor calls, text messages, and locations of selected users, flagging each time they use words such as “protest” or “revolution“. Mention of these words may trigger heavier surveillance, or be used as evidence against those being watched.
The junta is also monitoring social media use, including data from visited websites, as well as conversations over public and private chat groups. According to the Frontier report, this “cybersecurity team” is based inside the police’s Special Branch, a notorious surveillance department that heavily monitored suspected dissidents in the previous era of junta rule.
Meanwhile, the regime has also introduced amendments that legalize these restrictive measures, such as to the Penal Code, the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, and the Electronic Transactions Law. With these provisions, which have completely bypassed any form of democratic scrutiny, the junta has introduced harsher penalties for an extensive list of actions, including online speech, all while increasing its power over telecommunications operations.
Shutting down the Internet – as well as a host of other factors that are a result, directly or indirectly, of the coup – has decimated Myanmar’s economy. For example, Facebook, by far the most dominant online platform before the coup, remains blocked, including for those who rely on the social media network for their business.
The limited access to information is also undermining the country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the day of the coup, daily reporting on cases was brought almost to a halt. Myanmar continues to record thousands of cases per day, and crucial information is only available through official channels (which people, understandably, do not trust), as independent media and communication health information channels remain blocked.
As the junta’s efforts of building a surveillance state look set to continue, it’s crucial that the international community continues to call out their tactics at every turn, including by ensuring that technology from their countries does not assist the military in their efforts, for example, through “dual use” tools – such as cyberinfrastructure, software, data collection, and security tools – which were originally installed for civilian use but later repurposed for military uses.
The crisis in Myanmar provides an unprecedented opportunity to review how businesses can uphold human rights, and those with any form of operations in the country must review their potential impacts to ensure their customers are safe from harassment and harm.
To counter the junta’s restrictions and surveillance, governments must cooperate with actors in the digital sphere to contribute towards providing safe and secure internet access, including technology and know-how that will enable users to bypass censorship, domain and service blocks, avoid monitoring, and access the Internet during outages.
The junta’s orders purposely violate human rights and endanger lives, and any company that complies risks being complicit in any harm to the user, including if they are the victim of abuse, torture, or murder. Orders may come under the barrel of a gun or the threat of sanctions or closure, but firms must recognize that compliance could lead to serious consequences. The country’s situation must serve as a reminder to telcos of their obligations to uphold human rights and their responsibility to protect the lives of their customers.
Defying the junta’s orders may be a final option, but should always be considered, and does not necessarily need to be the only recourse under current circumstances. As Telenor did immediately after the coup, they can publicly share these orders for surveillance, restrictions, and shutdowns. In fact, documentation of these demands that result in human rights violations will be important for when the time of reckoning comes for the junta.
Dr. Abel Pires Da Silva is a Member of Parliament (MP) in Timor-Leste, and a member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
