Jun 8, 2022 | CCHR, DFF, Internet Freedoms, Opinion Articles
By Eva Kusuma Sundari.
Indonesia has made a long journey since the fall of president Soeharto in 1998, from military dictatorship to a vibrant democracy in which most of its citizens enjoy greater political freedoms. This accomplishment has been accompanied by an impressive economic growth that has placed the vast archipelago in the Group of 20, where it is the only country representing ASEAN.
By holding the G20 presidency this year, and hosting the group’s summit in November, Indonesia has a unique position to give a voice to the often-sidelined aspirations of the Global South.
The Indonesian government should use that position to promote a form of inclusive collaboration among nations to address challenges that affect humanity as a whole. Among them are the need for stronger and more creative global responses to issues like the devastation caused by armed conflicts such as in Myanmar or Ukraine, the need to increase financial support for a sustainable energy transition, or the impact of the world’s digital transformation on human rights and democracy.
Indonesia has succeeded in sending its military back to the barracks. The country’s recent history of dictatorship, turmoil, and democratization has given it an invaluable wealth of experience that can provide a distinct advantage in its perspective on conflicts and their consequences.
Alongside other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia is already leading efforts within ASEAN to find peaceful solutions to the crisis in Myanmar, acting on the belief that only democracy and stability can foster economic development.
Now Indonesia could use the experience gained by its own history and propose a new working group at the G20 to discuss judicious responses from the largest economies in the world to crises like the one in Myanmar or those plunging countries such as Ukraine, Syria or Yemen into chaos. And, as the third biggest democracy in the world and the country with the largest Muslim population, Indonesia is particularly suited to play a role as peacemaker in the Muslim world.
Wars throughout the world are having devastating consequences that are not confined within national borders: from rising commodity prices, shortages of food and energy supplies, to increases in human trafficking and the production and trade of illicit drugs and weapons. In Myanmar, poverty has skyrocketed to rates not seen in 20 years.
The community of nations is in dire need of alternative platforms to explore new ways to tackle such crises. These platforms would work as complementary channels to global organizations like the United Nations, or regional groups like ASEAN, that have often failed to prevent atrocities, or alleviate the worst consequences of these wars. The G20 could be one of them and Indonesia is uniquely suited to initiate the discussion.
Meanwhile, the need for a sustainable energy transition is already in the G20 agenda, and Indonesia should be commended for acknowledging the importance of taking collective action to phase out fossil fuels and adopt renewable sources of energy.
The stakes have never been higher. The latest study from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has confirmed that current pledges to reduce carbon emissions will not be sufficient to slow global warming.
All countries must cut global emissions by 43 percent and reach net-zero carbon emissions by the early 2050s to avoid a climate catastrophe. Implementing a sustainable energy transition that takes into account the needs and perspectives of all the people involved is both the most efficient and cost-effective way to do so.
As a vital step, Indonesia must lead the G20 to agree to accelerate the phasing out from coal and fossil fuels, and to ensure there is sufficient financial support to do so. With its presidency, the country finds itself in the position to push for G20 countries to increase their financial commitments and assistance to those facing major barriers in their energy transition.
Last, but by no means least, as economies and societies at large increasingly move toward digitalization, it is no longer possible to ignore the powerful role played by “tech giants”, or big technological companies, in particular Google, Amazon, Meta, and Apple, in shaping not only the world economy, but the state of democracy and human rights globally.
The services these tech giants offer come at a huge cost. By harvesting and selling our personal data in order to predict and shape consumers’ behavior, they track our online behavior in every view, click, purchase, and interaction, in order to analyze and monetize it. The profits obtained by these enormous companies on the back of people’s personal data are bigger than some rich countries’ gross domestic product.
Their unregulated money-making model is also allowing them to profit from the spread of disinformation, divisiveness, and hate. And these phenomena are undermining democracy, stability, and social cohesion in many countries, from the United States, where conspiracy theories like Qanon are spreading like fire, to the Philippines, where online disinformation is rampant.
Indonesia leads the streamlining of digital issues in the various working groups of the G20, and rallies for an inclusive, empowering and sustainable digital transformation aimed at a resilient recovery from the pandemic. But it must also ensure that these discussions do not take place without addressing the damage that the Big Tech’s business models are having on people’s individual rights and democracy worldwide.
Indonesia is not new to playing a central role in world affairs. In 1955, it organized the Bandung Conference, a watershed moment that led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. The world has changed enormously since then, but Indonesia finds itself now in a position where it can once again represent the interests and aspirations of the Global South and help to find solutions to problems that deeply affect all the inhabitants of this planet.
Eva Kusuma Sundari is a board member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), and a former member of Indonesian House of Representatives.
This article first appeared in The Jakarta Post.
May 16, 2022 | Internet Freedoms, Statements
We, the following 32 human rights organizations, call on the Cambodian authorities to revoke the Sub-Decree on the Establishment of the National Internet Gateway (NIG). Since passage of the sub-decree on February 16, 2021, the government has yet to address the serious human rights concerns raised by civil society groups and tech companies. At the same time, the government has been wholly non-transparent regarding the infrastructure, implementation, financing, and cooperating companies, agencies, and organizations involved in supporting the NIG.
The NIG sub-decree paves the way for the establishment of a digital gateway to manage all internet traffic into and out of Cambodia. Provisions in the sub-decree allow government-appointed NIG operators to block or disconnect any online connections (article 6), retain traffic data for a year and provide other network information as requested by authorities (article 14), and issue overbroad penalties for non-compliant telecommunications operators (article 16).
The sub-decree states that the purpose of the NIG is to facilitate and manage internet connections to strengthen revenue collection, protect national security, and — in terms that are overbroad, ambiguous, and prone to misuse — to “preserve social order, culture, and national tradition” (article 1).
While the exact technical infrastructure and how it will be operated is still unknown, there is little doubt the NIG’s true purpose is to enable the Cambodian government to tighten the noose on what remains of internet freedom in the country.
In April 2021, three independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council expressed concerns that the sub-decree “poses risks to the fundamental freedoms of individuals, namely the freedoms of expression and opinion and the right to privacy and may expose individuals’ personal information without their consent, which would contravene international human rights instruments and Cambodian laws.” They reiterated this call to the government on February 1 2022, warning that the NIG “will have a serious negative impact on internet freedom, human rights defenders and civil society in the country, further shrinking the already-restrictive civic space in Cambodia.”
Cambodia is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 17 of the ICCPR protects the right of every individual against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy. Article 19 of the ICCPR protects the right to freedom of expression. This right includes the “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.” Any measures the state takes that would interfere with these rights must be provided for by law, be non-discriminatory, and be strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the rights of others, national security, public order or public health or morals.
The government has repeatedly rejected all human rights concerns about the NIG. The government has also refused to explain how the NIG’s restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information are necessary to achieve any of the legitimate aims, and failed to address the lack of proportionality of the measures. Instead, the internet gateway is poised to restrict these rights in an overly broad manner, without any apparent limits. As UN experts, tech company representatives, and human rights advocates have pointed out, the sub-decree lacks procedural safeguards, independent oversight, and data and privacy protections.
There are grave concerns that the gateway will supercharge the government’s censorship capabilities, allowing it to scale up its website blocking. The gateway is also likely to have a chilling effect on online communications and generate self-censorship online among critical voices and independent media outlets who fear increased surveillance, harassment, and reprisals.
The sub-decree poses risks to data protection and data privacy, requiring government gateway operators to retain and share metadata. In the absence of a data protection law in Cambodia that would protect internet users from misuse of their data and provide certainty about where and how long data is retained, and who has access to it, the NIG will facilitate the authorities’ ability to identify users’ internet activities and habits, ultimately risking identifying the users themselves. Data retention without sufficient protection for data security will increase risks to data security from third-party interference, or hackers. Centralizing internet traffic and data under the NIG also creates a vulnerability for malicious acts, without guaranteeing service providers’ capacity to adequately address the resultant increase in data security needs.
In a press statement issued on February 15, 2022, Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that it had conducted an “extensive study on infrastructure models from different countries around the world and found that most countries have internet gateways.” No information has been provided to back these sweeping assertions, such as which infrastructure models the authorities considered, what their benefits and disadvantages are, and whether the study was done with reference to Cambodia’s human rights obligations under various international human rights treaties.
In Cambodia, the government’s rushed adoption process of the sub-decree establishing the NIG was plagued by a lack of transparency. The authorities failed to hold any consultations, much less wide and inclusive ones, and did not invite inputs by experts, civil society groups, private actors, business groups, and other interested parties prior to the sub-decree’s adoption. The NIG appears designed to function as an authoritarian tool that will facilitate the government’s efforts to curtail free expression, association and privacy online as well as offline, and facilitate targeting of online expression by members of civil society, independent media, and the political opposition.
On February 15, 2022, the government revealed that implementation of the NIG, set to start the next day, would be delayed. No new date for the NIG implementation has been set. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications told the news outlet Nikkei Asia on February 15 that the delay was due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, another ministry spokesperson told the news outlet VOD that technical difficulties in implementing the NIG was the cause of the delay, stating that “we have to prepare to install and order equipment in order to prepare and create the gateway. And we have to give licenses to any company that the government understands that has the ability to create the gateway.”
Cambodia’s internet gateway greatly risks restricting the free flow of information between Cambodia and the rest of the world while establishing a system that will cast a wide net of surveillance across the country. Foreign governments, technology and telecommunications companies, internet service providers, business groups, UN agencies and others concerned should come together to seek to halt this wholesale attempt at information control.
Signatories:
Access Now
Amnesty International
ARTICLE 19
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
Asia Democracy Network (ADN)
Association for Progressive Communication (APC)
Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (BNNRC)
Campaign for Human Rights and Development International (CHRDI)
Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR Centre)
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Civil Rights Defenders
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
Digital Reach Asia
Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFF)
ELSAM: Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy
Freemuse
Foundation for Media Alternatives
FORUM-ASIA
Japan Computer Access Network (JCA-NET)
Human Rights Watch
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX)
Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada (LRWC)
Manushya Foundation
Open Net Association
PEN America
Ranking Digital Rights
SAFENet – Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network
Thai Netizens Network
WITNESS
World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)
Mar 9, 2022 | Internet Freedoms, Statements
Eleven human rights organizations call on the Philippine legislature to repeal or substantially amend the fatally flawed SIM Card Registration Act, which is a substantial threat to the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and information, and non-discrimination in the Philippines.
We are concerned about the grave risks that the SIM Card Registration Act poses to the rights to privacy, free expression and information, association and non-discrimination in the Philippines. We are further concerned about the discriminatory impact of the law on transgender and gender diverse individuals, in the absence of legal gender recognition in the country.
The SIM Card Registration Act was ratified by the House of Representatives and Senate on 2 February 2022, and lapsed into law on 4 March 2022. Under the Act, Public Telecommunications Entities (PTEs) must require the registration of SIM cards for collection in a centralized database as a pre-requisite to the sale and activation of SIM cards. Further, all social media account providers must record the real names and phone numbers as part of the registration process upon creation of an account. In effect, these requirements amount to a blanket prohibition on anonymity for telecommunication and social media users. Completed registrations will then be forwarded to a centralized database, without clear limitations on access to or use of personal information. Guidelines for the “proper implementation” of the registration program will be formulated by the National Telecommunications Commission, in consultation with government agencies such as the Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Information and Communications Technology and National Privacy Commission, and PTEs, social media providers, and major consumer groups.
Prohibitions of anonymity interfere with the right to privacy and freedom of expression, protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is a party. As noted by the former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression stated in his 2013 report, restrictions on anonymity “facilitate State communications surveillance” and “have a chilling effect, dissuading the free expression of information and ideas”.
In the Philippines, human rights defenders and those who lawfully exercise their right to criticize the government are frequently targeted and sanctioned for their work, including through the dangerous practice of red-tagging. Human rights defenders in the Philippines have reported that the Philippine police monitor Facebook posts to identify, arrest and interrogate people. The real-name registration requirements exacerbate concerns of surveillance of telecommunications and online activity by the Philippine authorities, and is likely to dissuade individuals from expressing themselves freely without fear of retribution.
Inconsistent with human rights law and principles
Under the ICCPR, where a government action interferes with human rights, it will only be permissible if its terms are defined narrowly and precisely and it is strictly necessary for a legitimate purpose such as protecting national security, public order or public health. The SIM Card Registration Act states that the registration requirements are intended to, among other things, “deter the […] spread of digital disinformation or fake news”. This is a vague and overbroad concept, left undefined in the Act. It is also not a legitimate purpose for the restriction of rights, absent a compelling national security, public health or public order purpose. The prohibition of “fake news” is “not in itself a legitimate aim”. Demands for user information by a “competent authority” may also be issued to PTEs and social media providers if a specific mobile number or social media account was or is being used to spread “digital disinformation” or “fake news”.
Even as the law has been introduced purportedly to combat anonymous crimes and scams, there is a lack of evidence as to how SIM card registration laws can effectively prevent such threats—evident from similar laws brought into force in other jurisdictions, including Kenya, Mexico and Malawi. Industry and technical experts have raised these concerns with respect to the current Philippine law. Without clear limitations on the type and quantity of user information collected; provisions to securely store and handle such information; and clauses limiting data storage to strictly legal and necessary purposes, the law will in fact increase the risk of data breach or information misuse and violate data protection and privacy.
The Act also runs afoul of the principles of necessity and proportionality, according to which any interference on rights must be necessary for a legitimate purpose and be the least intrusive means of achieving the purpose. The former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression noted in his 2015 report that “[b]lanket prohibitions [on encryption and anonymity] fail to be necessary and proportionate”. Further, the prescription of criminal penalties, including imprisonment and/or onerous fines, for using fictitious identities to register and/or spoofing registered SIM cards appear to be disproportionate. Generally, criminal sanctions constitute “serious interference with the freedom of expression and are disproportionate responses in all but the most egregious cases”.
The criminal sanctions for using fictitious identities to register SIM cards or social media accounts will also disproportionately impact gender diverse individuals in the Philippines. The legislation itself unequivocally considers lived names as “fictitious identities”. In the Philippines, it is generally not possible for transgender and gender diverse individuals to change their names assigned at birth or gender marker on legal documents in the absence of a gender recognition law. Criminalizing the use of lived names to register for SIM cards or social media accounts is an act that is discriminatory, traumatizing and violent to gender diverse individuals.
The Act also grants sweeping powers to the Philippine authorities to demand disclosure of information obtained in the registration process without adequate independent oversight, empowering authorities to access data in an unfettered and potentially unlawful manner. Under the law, registration information may be disclosed in “compliance with a court order, legal process, or other government regulatory, or enforceable administrative request for information” or upon “order of a competent authority duly authorized under existing laws to issue subpoena”. The Act does not provide any safeguards to ensure strictly necessary and secure holding or furnishing of such information, and does not establish an independent oversight body, such as a court or oversight mechanism, to monitor State demands for disclosure of personal information.
Repeal or substantially amend the Act
In light of the above-mentioned concerns, we call for the Philippine legislature to repeal or substantially amend the SIM Card Registration Act, in compliance with the Philippines’ international human rights obligations. While we acknowledge the need to curb fraud and other crimes, we urge the Philippine authorities to do so in a manner that respects and ensures the rights to privacy, free expression and information, association and non-discrimination.
Signatories
Access Now
ARTICLE 19
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
ASEAN SOGIE Caucus
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
EngageMedia
Human Rights Online Philippines (HRonlinePH)
ILGA Asia
In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDEFEND)
International Commission of Jurists
Open Net
Mar 2, 2022 | Internet Freedoms, Tools for MPs
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the role of the Internet as a basic necessity, indispensable to conducting work, attending school, and participating in social and political activities. In January 2021, around 59.5% of the world’s population was using the Internet, 10% of which is in Southeast Asia. The United Nations and many governments around the world have also recognized internet access as a human right, the fulfilment of which relies on the safe and free exercise of Internet freedoms.
As Internet use continuously grows, it has also become a battleground for human rights, with state and non-state actors using it to either put people at risk of human rights abuses or prevent individuals from fully and safely exercising their Internet freedoms.
To empower parliamentarians (MPs) to advocate for internet freedoms, APHR in partnership with the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), presents this Toolkit for Parliamentarians: Promoting Internet Freedoms in Southeast Asia. It introduces the international norms and standards governing internet freedoms, highlights common and pressing challenges found in the region, and outlines recommendations for MPs on how they can utilize their role to promote and strengthen these freedoms.
DOWNLOAD HERE
Jan 17, 2022 | DFF, Internet Freedoms, Statements
APHR joined more than 100 non-government organizations and academics in sending the following letter, urging Members of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime to ensure that its work includes meaningful civil society participation, and that any proposed convention on cybercrime incorporates clear and robust human rights safeguards.
H.E. Ms Faouzia Boumaiza Mebarki,
Chairperson,
Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes
Your Excellency,
We, the undersigned organizations and academics, work to protect and advance human rights, online and offline. Efforts to address cybercrime are of concern to us, both because cybercrime poses a threat to human rights and livelihoods, and because cybercrime laws, policies, and initiatives are currently being used to undermine people’s rights. We therefore ask that the process through which the Ad Hoc Committee does its work includes robust civil society participation throughout all stages of the development and drafting of a convention, and that any proposed convention include human rights safeguards applicable to both its substantive and procedural provisions.
Background
The proposal to elaborate a comprehensive “international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes” is being put forward at the same time that UN human rights mechanisms are raising alarms about the abuse of cybercrime laws around the world. In his 2019 report, the UN special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, observed, “A surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protesters in many countries around the world.” In 2019 and once again this year, the UN General Assembly expressed grave concerns that cybercrime legislation is being misused to target human rights defenders or hinder their work and endanger their safety in a manner contrary to international law. This follows years of reporting from non-governmental organizations on the human rights abuses stemming from overbroad cybercrime laws.
When the convention was first proposed, over 40 leading digital rights and human rights organizations and experts, including many signatories of this letter, urged delegations to vote against the resolution, warning that the proposed convention poses a threat to human rights.
In advance of the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee, we reiterate these concerns. If a UN convention on cybercrime is to proceed, the goal should be to combat the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes without endangering the fundamental rights of those it seeks to protect, so people can freely enjoy and exercise their rights, online and offline. Any proposed convention should incorporate clear and robust human rights safeguards. A convention without such safeguards or that dilutes States’ human rights obligations would place individuals at risk and make our digital presence even more insecure, each threatening fundamental human rights.
As the Ad Hoc Committee commences its work drafting the convention in the coming months, it is vitally important to apply a human rights-based approach to ensure that the proposed text is not used as a tool to stifle freedom of expression, infringe on privacy and data protection, or endanger individuals and communities at risk.
The important work of combating cybercrime should be consistent with States’ human rights obligations set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and other international human rights instruments and standards. In other words, efforts to combat cybercrime should also protect, not undermine, human rights. We remind States that the same rights that individuals have offline should also be protected online.
Scope of Substantive Criminal Provisions
There is no consensus on how to tackle cybercrime at the global level or a common understanding or definition of what constitutes cybercrime. From a human rights perspective, it is essential to keep the scope of any convention on cybercrime narrow. Just because a crime might involve technology does not mean it needs to be included in the proposed convention. For example, expansive cybercrime laws often simply add penalties due to the use of a computer or device in the commission of an existing offense. The laws are especially problematic when they include content-related crimes. Vaguely worded cybercrime laws purporting to combat misinformation and online support for or glorification of terrorism and extremism, can be misused to imprison bloggers or block entire platforms in a given country. As such, they fail to comply with international freedom of expression standards. Such laws put journalists, activists, researchers, LGBTQ communities, and dissenters in danger, and can have a chilling effect on society more broadly.
Even laws that focus more narrowly on cyber-enabled crimes are used to undermine rights. Laws criminalizing unauthorized access to computer networks or systems have been used to target digital security researchers, whistleblowers, activists, and journalists. Too often, security researchers, who help keep everyone safe, are caught up in vague cybercrime laws and face criminal charges for identifying flaws in security systems. Some States have also interpreted unauthorized access laws so broadly as to effectively criminalize any and all whistleblowing; under these interpretations, any disclosure of information in violation of a corporate or government policy could be treated as “cybercrime.” Any potential convention should explicitly include a malicious intent standard, should not transform corporate or government computer use policies into criminal liability, should provide a clearly articulated and expansive public interest defense, and include clear provisions that allow security researchers to do their work without fear of prosecution.
Human Rights and Procedural Safeguards
Our private and personal information, once locked in a desk drawer, now resides on our digital devices and in the cloud. Police around the world are using an increasingly intrusive set of investigative tools to access digital evidence. Frequently, their investigations cross borders without proper safeguards and bypass the protections in mutual legal assistance treaties. In many contexts, no judicial oversight is involved, and the role of independent data protection regulators is undermined. National laws, including cybercrime legislation, are often inadequate to protect against disproportionate or unnecessary surveillance.
Any potential convention should detail robust procedural and human rights safeguards that govern criminal investigations pursued under such a convention. It should ensure that any interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality, including by requiring independent judicial authorization of surveillance measures. It should also not forbid States from adopting additional safeguards that limit law enforcement uses of personal data, as such a prohibition would undermine privacy and data protection. Any potential convention should also reaffirm the need for States to adopt and enforce “strong, robust and comprehensive privacy legislation, including on data privacy, that complies with international human rights law in terms of safeguards, oversight and remedies to effectively protect the right to privacy.”
There is a real risk that, in an attempt to entice all States to sign a proposed UN cybercrime convention, bad human rights practices will be accommodated, resulting in a race to the bottom. Therefore, it is essential that any potential convention explicitly reinforces procedural safeguards to protect human rights and resists shortcuts around mutual assistance agreements.
Meaningful Participation
Going forward, we ask the Ad Hoc Committee to actively include civil society organizations in consultations—including those dealing with digital security and groups assisting vulnerable communities and individuals—which did not happen when this process began in 2019 or in the time since.
Accordingly, we request that the Committee:
● Accredit interested technological and academic experts and nongovernmental groups, including those with relevant expertise in human rights but that do not have consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN, in a timely and transparent manner, and allow participating groups to register multiple representatives to accommodate the remote participation across different time zones.
● Ensure that modalities for participation recognize the diversity of non-governmental stakeholders, giving each stakeholder group adequate speaking time, since civil society, the private sector, and academia can have divergent views and interests.
● Ensure effective participation by accredited participants, including the opportunity to receive timely access to documents, provide interpretation services, speak at the Committee’s sessions (in-person and remotely), and submit written opinions and recommendations.
● Maintain an up-to-date, dedicated webpage with relevant information, such as practical information (details on accreditation, time/location, and remote participation), organizational documents (i.e., agendas, discussions documents, etc.), statements and other interventions by States and other stakeholders, background documents, working documents and draft outputs, and meeting reports.
Countering cybercrime should not come at the expense of the fundamental rights and dignity of those whose lives this proposed Convention will touch. States should ensure that any proposed cybercrime convention is in line with their human rights obligations, and they should oppose any proposed convention that is inconsistent with those obligations.
We would be highly appreciative if you could kindly circulate the present letter to the Ad Hoc Committee Members and publish it on the website of the Ad Hoc Committee.
Signatories,*
- Access Now – International
- Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN) – Burma
- Alternatives – Canada
- Alternative Informatics Association – Turkey
- AqualtuneLab – Brazil
- ArmSec Foundation – Armenia
- ARTICLE 19 – International
- Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) – Argentina
- Asociación Trinidad / Radio Viva – Trinidad
- Asociatia Pentru Tehnologie si Internet (ApTI) – Romania
- Association for Progressive Communications (APC) – International
- Associação Mundial de Rádios Comunitárias (Amarc Brasil) – Brazil
- ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) – Southeast Asia
- Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (BNNRC) – Bangladesh
- BlueLink Information Network – Bulgaria
- Brazilian Institute of Public Law – Brazil
- Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) – Cambodia
- Cambodian Institute for Democracy – Cambodia
- Cambodia Journalists Alliance Association – Cambodia
- Casa de Cultura Digital de Porto Alegre – Brazil
- Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law – Ukraine
- Centre for Free Expression – Canada
- Centre for Multilateral Affairs – Uganda
- Center for Democracy & Technology – United States
- Civil Society Europe
- Coalition Direitos na Rede – Brazil
- Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) – Africa
- CyberHUB-AM – Armenia
- Data Privacy Brazil Research Association – Brazil
- Dataskydd – Sweden
- Derechos Digitales – Latin America
- Defending Rights & Dissent – United States
- Digital Citizens – Romania
- DigitalReach – Southeast Asia
- Digital Security Lab – Ukraine
- Državljan D / Citizen D – Slovenia
- Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) – International
- Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) – United States
- Elektronisk Forpost Norge – Norway
- Epicenter.works for digital rights – Austria
- European Center For Not-For-Profit Law (ECNL) Stichting – Europe
- European Civic Forum – Europe
- European Digital Rights (EDRi) – Europe
- eQuality Project – Canada
- Fantsuam Foundation – Nigeria
- Free Speech Coalition – United States
- Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA) – Philippines
- Fundación Acceso – Central America
- Fundación Ciudadanía y Desarrollo de Ecuador
- Fundación CONSTRUIR – Bolivia
- Fundación Karisma – Colombia
- Fundación OpenlabEC – Ecuador
- Fundamedios – Ecuador
- Garoa Hacker Clube – Brazil
- Global Partners Digital – United Kingdom
- GreenNet – United Kingdom
- GreatFire – China
- Hiperderecho – Peru
- Homo Digitalis – Greece
- Human Rights in China – China
- Human Rights Defenders Network – Sierra Leone
- Human Rights Watch – International
- Igarapé Institute — Brazil
- IFEX – International
- Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) – Indonesia
- The Influencer Platform – Ukraine
- INSM Network for Digital Rights – Iraq
- Internews Ukraine
- Instituto Beta: Internet & Democracia (IBIDEM) – Brazil
- Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor (IDEC) – Brazil
- Instituto Educadigital – Brazil
- Instituto Nupef – Brazil
- Instituto de Pesquisa em Direito e Tecnologia do Recife (IP.rec) – Brazil
- Instituto de Referência em Internet e Sociedade (IRIS) – Brazil
- Instituto Panameño de Derecho y Nuevas Tecnologías (IPANDETEC) – Panama
- Instituto para la Sociedad de la Información y la Cuarta Revolución Industrial – Peru
- International Commission of Jurists – International
- The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
- IT-Pol – Denmark
- JCA-NET – Japan
- KICTANet – Kenya
- Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet – South Korea
- Laboratorio de Datos y Sociedad (Datysoc) – Uruguay
- Laboratório de Políticas Públicas e Internet (LAPIN) – Brazil
- Latin American Network of Surveillance, Technology and Society Studies (LAVITS)
- Lawyers Hub Africa
- Legal Initiatives for Vietnam
- Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH) – France
- Masaar – Technology and Law Community – Egypt
- Manushya Foundation – Thailand
- MINBYUN Lawyers for a Democratic Society – Korea
- Open Culture Foundation – Taiwan
- Open Media – Canada
- Open Net Association – Korea
- OpenNet Africa – Uganda
- Panoptykon Foundation – Poland
- Paradigm Initiative – Nigeria
- Privacy International – International
- Radio Viva – Paraguay
- Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D) – Mexico
- Regional Center for Rights and Liberties – Egypt
- Research ICT Africa
- Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) – Canada
- Share Foundation – Serbia
- Social Media Exchange (SMEX) – Lebanon, Arab Region
- SocialTIC – Mexico
- Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) – Southeast Asia
- Supporters for the Health and Rights of Workers in the Semiconductor Industry (SHARPS) – South Korea
- Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (STOP) – United States
- Tecnología, Investigación y Comunidad (TEDIC) – Paraguay
- Thai Netizen Network – Thailand
- Unwanted Witness – Uganda
- Vrijschrift – Netherlands
- West African Human Rights Defenders Network – Togo
- World Movement for Democracy – International
- 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media – Arab Region
Individual Experts and Academics
- Jacqueline Abreu, University of São Paulo
- Chan-Mo Chung, Professor, Inha University School of Law
- Danilo Doneda, Brazilian Institute of Public Law
- David Kaye, Clinical Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law, former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2014-2020)
- Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Professor Emeritus, University of Aarhus; Member, Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace
- Douwe Korff, Emeritus Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University
- Fabiano Menke, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
- Kyung-Sin Park, Professor, Korea University School of Law
- Christopher Parsons, Senior Research Associate, Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto
- Marietje Schaake, Stanford Cyber Policy Center
- Valerie Steeves, J.D., Ph.D., Full Professor, Department of Criminology University of Ottawa
*List of signatories as of January 13, 2022
Dec 9, 2021 | DFF, Internet Freedoms
Dear Ms Haugen,
We greatly appreciate your courage and tenacity in exposing the wrongdoings of Facebook and helping to
safeguard our democracies. Following your recent public interventions to policymakers and legislations, we
are writing to invite you to open up a dialogue with civil society and human rights organisations like us.
Whistle-blowers like you show the urgent need to set democratic rules and human rights framework for
digital platforms. Your revelations have laid bare some of the systemic risks deriving from the tech giant’s
misbehaviour that we have been denouncing for years: social media companies like Facebook continue to
resist changing their extractive and divisive business models, despite knowing that their products and
commercial logics are harming users.
We are glad that you put your knowledge and experience at the disposal of legislators, governments and
regulators around the world and that you shared with them the overwhelming evidence that you bravely
collected and that constitutes an unparalleled source of information.
At the same time though, we also firmly believe that the discussion on these issues must not be limited to
legislators and governments. We need the active participation of all stakeholders to ensure that we end up
with solutions that work for business and people alike. A dialogue with civil society organisations is crucial
in this process. We need to find synergies and build together a fairer, decentralised, more transparent and
accountable digital environment.
As representatives of civil society, we are and want to remain a fundamental part of this debate. Yet, due to
systemic power and information asymmetries, we often lack access to evidence and information for our
activities and campaigns. This inevitably skews the political debates and lobbying activities that are taking
place in Europe and worldwide.
So here is our proposal: We would kindly ask you for an opportunity to, first, speak to you and exchange our
ideas, and to, second, have access to the Facebook dossiers that you have revealed. This would enormously
benefit our common cause.
Discussing with you our proposals will help us better understand and assess their strengths and weaknesses.
Your insights would be a unique opportunity for us to test and progress with our ideas. In addition, having
access to the evidence you collected would not only support our evidence-based policy making and public
calls for interventions, but also benefit our efforts to monitor, denounce and litigate cases of violations of
users’ rights.
All in all, we would be delighted if we could meet and exchange our thoughts and ideas. We would be happy
to schedule a dedicated meeting at your earliest convenience.
Many thanks in advance for your valuable time and contribution, and we are looking forward to hearing from
you soon.
Kind regards
Undersigned civil society organisations
List of signatories
International
ARTICLE 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
International Commission of Jurists
Americas
Coletivo Brasil de Comunicação Social
Coletivo Digital São Paulo/Brazil
Derechos Digitales
Idec – Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor
Instituto Cultura e Democracia (Brasil)
IPANDETEC – Centroamérica
Observatório da Ética Jornalística (objETHOS)
Rede Latino-americana de Estudos sobre Vigilância, Tecnologia e Sociedade (LAVITS)
Asia
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
Fortify Rights
Legal Initiatives for Vietnam
The 88 Project, Vietnam
Europe
Digitale Gesellschaft, Switzerland
Državljan D/ Citizen D, Slovenia
noyb – European Center for Digital Rights, Austria
Open Rights Group, The United Kingdom
Panoptykon Foundation, Poland
Wikimedia France, France
